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THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS: IS THERE STILL
A PLACE FOR THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION?
Sara Catherine Smitht
I. INTRODUCTION
"The FTAA... is a fundamental part of a much wider strategy."
'
- Paulo G. F. Vizentini
In 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) was a great plan for
liberalizing trade. Governments could gather to negotiate trade
agreements, settle trade disputes, and create a system of trading rules.2
Currently, the main vein of the WTO consists of negotiated documents
that provide the legal ground-rules for international trade.3 The Most-
Favored-Nation and National Treatment principles set the undertone,
promoting free trade that is non-discriminatory.4 Nations violate such
t J.D., University of Tulsa College of Law, Tulsa, Oklahoma, May 2007; B.A. With
Distinction, International Business, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, May
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1. Paulo G. F. Vizentini, The FTAA and US Strategy: A Southern Point of View, in
FREE TRADE FOR THE AMERICAS? THE UNITED STATES' PUSH FOR THE FTAA
AGREEMENT 11(Paulo Vizentini & Marianne Wiesebron eds., 2004).
2. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 9 (The World Trade Organization 3d ed. 2003) (1995).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 10.
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
principles by forming free-trade areas and other regional trade agreements
(RTAs) that provide group members with preferential treatment.5
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a code of
rules regulating trade relations among the parties, allows for certain
discriminatory treatment under Articles XXIV and XVIII, given that anyS 6
preferential trading practice complies with the regulations provided. As
the number of regional trade agreements increases, the size of preferential
trading groups tends to grow. One of the newest and hotly disputed
negotiations is the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),
encompassing all the countries of North and South America with the
exception of Cuba.' The many fears and concerns expressed by the
negotiating countries maintain that free-trade is not always fair.8
However, if the negotiating parties of the FTAA reach an agreement, the
WTO and its ground-rules may no longer hold any authority in a world
with such powerful trading nations.' As the WTO's health becomes more
fragile, "the unprotected threat from the RTAs could strike the fatal
blow."10
Part II of this comment focuses on the history behind the GATT,
the WTO, and the transformation from multilateralism to regionalism. It
continues to analyze the founding principles of the GATT, and the
flexibility of such principles that allow a contracting member to opt-out of
certain obligations. Part III takes a narrow regional agreement, the Free
Trade Area of the Americas, and applies the regional manipulation of the
GATT principles. Part IV proposes the idea that the WTO will loose
influence and support if the FTAA negotiations prove successful. Part IV
continues to suggest that as the world shifts, operating mostly on a regional
level, multilateral trade agreements may no longer be necessary. Finally,
5. Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing World,
21 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 975, 988-89 (2000) (introducing preferential treatment and inequality).
6. Article XXIV, in THE TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
41, 41-44 (GATT ed., Geneva, Switz., 1986) [hereinafter GATT, Article XXIV].
7. Mario E. Carranza, Latin American Perspective: MERCOSUR, the Free Trade Area
of the Americas, and the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1029, 1030 (2004).
8. See generally MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 589-594 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2003) (pointing out the
future challenges that face the WTO and explaining that a degree of unfairness will always
plague a certain market or certain countries).
9. Colin B. Picker, Regional Trade Agreements v. The WTO: A Proposal for Reform of
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Part V concludes by proposing that the success of the FTAA will deliver
the hardest blow to any success the WTO hopes to obtain in the future.
II. IT ALL BEGAN WITH GATT
Although many nations favored the idea of the International Trade
Organization (ITO), it needed support from the United States." The ITO
never gained U.S. approval, but the General Agreement on Tariffs and
12Trade, which took form as an international organization. With respect to
trade and economics, each party committed "to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment.., developing the full use of the resources of
the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods." 13 All
contracting parties to the GATT receive the benefits of lower tariffs by
limiting tariffs to those agreed upon in the Schedule of Concessions. 4 Of
all the components of the GATT, most disputes and confusion originate
with the Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and National Treatment
principles. 5  Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) is a non-discrimination
principle, legally binding all contracting parties to accord equal treatment
to all other members.16  National Treatment requires that contracting
parties treat imports no less favorably than their own domestic goods. 7 In
1994, the GATT was amended, and the Uruguay Round, determined to
reduce non-tariff barriers, transformed it into the current World Trade
Organization (WTO). 8
The Uruguay Round of the WTO based its principles on
multilateralism, providing that each country concede something of value to
create a system that offers benefits to citizens of all the states involved. 19
11. See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 2 (following the adoption of the United
Nations, the UN Economic and Social Council favored an international organization
designed to develop and coordinate trade among the nations. It was to be called the
International Trade Organization, which eventually evolved into the WTO many years
later).
12. Id.
13. GATT, Article XXIV, supra note 6, at 1.
14. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.
15. See id. at 143-80.
16. Id. at 143:
17. Id. at 156.
18. Id. at 6.
19. See Laura Altieri, Between Empire and Community: The United States and
Multilateralism 2001-2003: A Mid- Term Assessment: Trade and Economic Affairs: NAFTA
and the FTAA: Regional Alternatives to Multilateralism, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 847, 850
(2003).
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The benefits include greater market access to goods and services by
reduction of tariffs, relaxation of domestic requirements, and lowering of
quotas. Tariff reduction provides equal benefits for all producers, while it
also serves the consumers' best interests, forcing producers to compete
21through low-cost or high-quality techniques. Multilateralism, agreements
shared with all WTO members, creates trade and furthers trade
22liberalization, which remains a central goal in the WTO . The WTO gives
rich and poor nations the equal right to challenge each other and equal
21
opportunities in the bargaining process.
On the contrary, "regionalism is a widespread phenomenon" that
works to divert and restrict trade, rather than create it.z4 Regional trade
agreements create preferential trading areas, also known as free-trade
areas, or customs unions.25 The free-trade area eliminates internal tariffs
and barriers, but allows members to remain autonomous with their
26
external trade policies. A customs union eliminates internal barriers, but
creates common external trade policies.27 RTAs continue to contribute to
the obstacles and difficulties currently facing the WTO by eroding the
development of the original multilateral trading system.2 Regionalism
shares similarities with imperial preferences, granting preferential
treatment to insiders while discriminating against outsiders.29 "[Customs
unions and free-trade areas] are inconsistent with the principle of MFN
treatment."30 History shows U.S. trade policy embracing multilateralism
and non-discrimination; however, NAFTA (the North American Free
Trade Agreement) and the recent Free Trade Area of the Americas
suggest that the United States gladly supports preferential trade.31
20. Id. at 850.
21. Id.
22. See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 595.
23. 10 BENEFITS OF THE WTO TRADING SYSTEM 4 (WTO OMC ed., World Trade
Organization 2003), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
24. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 342-43.
25. Id. at 343-44.
26. Id. at 344.
27. Id.
28. Picker, supra note 9, at 270.
29. DAVID PALMETER, THE WTO AS A LEGAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW AND POLICY 139 (2003).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 140.
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A. The Most-Favored-Nation Principle
Most-Favored-Nation requires that any contracting party giving an
advantage or immunity from trade barriers to one product, must
immediately grant the same treatment to like products of all other
32
contracting parties. MFN applies to cases of discrimination between like
products on the basis of country of origin, and it protects from any
discrimination created through procedural requirements or practices.33
WTO members can only claim MFN rights through bilateral or
multilateral treaty provisions.34 In the absence of a treaty, states may
freely employ discriminatory economic policies, making attempts to
establish the MFN principle as a respected international law unsuccessful.35
The negotiation of trade agreements with other members, in the hope of
creating a free-trade area, demonstrates the lack of effort by the
negotiators to pursue the multilateral negotiations supported by the
WTO. 36 Free-trade agreements entered into by the United States, and
nearly all WTO member nations, represent a departure from the original
goal of the MFN principle.37 Regional Trade Agreements, creating
preferential trading areas, violate the MFN principle, however, the
language of Article XXIV of the GATT provides an exception.
1. Article XXIV Exception to the MFN Principle
When the drafters of the exception for customs unions in GATT
Article XXIV expanded it to include free-trade areas, the WTO
Secretariat considered it "'the major exception' to the 'fundamental
GATT principle' of MFN treatment., 39  Article XXIV permits the
formation of a customs union or free-trade area, provided that the
contracting parties recognize its purpose as facilitating trade between
members.4° To form a regional trade agreement, Article XXIV requires
the elimination of "trade barriers on 'substantially all' the trade among its
32. Sydney M. Cone, The Promotion of Free-Trade Areas Viewed in Terms of Most-
Favored-Nation Treatment and "Imperial Preference," 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 563, 566 (2005).
33. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 149.
34. Id. at 146.
35. Id.
36. See Cone, supra note 32, at 564.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 566.
39. Id. (citing WTO Secretariate, Regionalism and the World Trading System 11-12
(1995)).
40. GATT, Article XXIV, supra note 6, at 41.
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members., 41 While it prohibits members of preferential trade areas from
raising external trade barriers, it allows members of the trade agreements
to discriminate in favor of other members.42
a. Regional Trade Agreements
In contrast to multilateralism, which encourages the free flow of
goods to areas of demand, regional trade agreements (RTAs) divert free-
trade by restricting the free flow of goods to a certain region.43 For
example, a low-cost producer may be denied access to consumers
demanding goods within a preferential trade area.44 This may seem to
benefit the high-cost producer within the region, yet it plagues the
consumer, causing high prices and a trade diversion lOSS. 45 On the other
hand, RTAs offer plenty of benefits as incentives for nations to join a
46preferential group. States often "join RTAs to ensure continued access
to a market already covered by an RTA," or to combine the comparative
advantages of each member state, providing more benefits to more
people.47
Although the original GATT recognized certain pre-existing
preferential trade agreements, those agreements failed to play a major role
in the global economy; they were merely tolerated for political reasons.48
For example, Great Britain was among the first of the European Nations
to promote the idea of "Imperial Free Trade," under which the British
Empire established a free-trade area completely inconsistent with the
Most-Favored-Nation principle.4 9  Pre-WTO, regional agreements
functioned as an initial step towards multilateral free-trade. ° Today, the
United States and other large economies assume the hegemonic role once
occupied by Great Britain. 1 The Free Trade Area of the Americas allows
the United States to gain access to the South American regional trade
41. Zakir Hafez, Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging WTO
Jurisprudence on RTAs, 79 N.D. L. REv. 879, 891 (2003) (citing GATTArt. XXIV: 8).
42. GATT, Article XXIV, supra note 6, at 41.
43. Altieri, supra note 19, at 850-51.
44. Id. at 851.
45. Id.
46. See Picker, supra note 9, at 274-79 (listing the benefits of RTAs as added economic
security, welfare gains, additional market access, and an increase in bargaining power).
47. See id. at 275.
48. Cone, supra note 32, at 570-71.
49. Id. at 572-73.
50. Altieri, supra note 19, at 851.
51. Cone, supra note 32, at 573-74.
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areas, such as MERCOSUR, and help complete an imperialistic type of
trading system52
(1) RTAs Take Advantage of GATT Article XXIV
Regional Trade Agreements have grown to be the norm, and no• 51
longer the exception. With nearly 162 RTAs in force, each WTO member
is affiliated with at least one trade agreement. 4 Every WTO member
recognizes the Most-Favored-Nation Principle of the GATT as a
prohibition against discriminatory trade policy, yet each RTA offers
special and differential treatment.55 Article XXIV of the GATT, the most
abused article, permits customs unions and free-trade areas that agree with
56the MFN principle. Contracting parties to the GATT utilize this
provision in a self-serving manner.57 According to the GATT language,
"the duties and other regulations.., shall not be higher or more restrictive
than [those] ... existing in the same constituent territories prior to the
formation of the free-trade area."' 8 Members potentially "benefit from
preferential rules of origin and regional content requirements," which
stood as trade obstacles pre-membership. 59 Although the goal of the
Article XXIV restrictions is to create trade among RTA members and
prohibit the increase of entry barriers to third parties, an RTA clearly
discriminates in favor of its member nations. 6°
Article XXIV requires that "substantially all" trade barriers must be
eliminated within the free-trade area or customs union.6' Because the
drafters of the GATT never determined the meaning of "substantially all,"
the wide spectrum of interpretations of this requirement hinders the
GATT's overall position on individual agreements. 6' Different trade areas
52. MERCOSUR is the Common Market of the Southern Cone consisting of Brazil,
Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. Carranza, supra note 7, at 1034; see also Cone, supra
note 32, at 578 (utilizing an imperialistic type of trading system, it is meant to have
complete free trade internally, but tariffs on imports outside the imperialistic trade area).
53. See Hafez, supra note 41, at 879.
54. Id.
55. Cone, supra note 32, at 564-65.
56. Hafez, supra note 41, at 880.
57. Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A
New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARVARD INT'L L.J. 419,421 (2001).
58. GATT, Article XXIV, supra note 6, at 42.
59. Chun Hung Lin, Regionalism or Globalism? The Process of Telecommunication
Cooperation within the OAS and NAFTA, 11 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 30, 34 (2002).
60. Hafez, supra note 41, at 891.
61. Id. at 889.
62. Id. at 891.
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vary on their interpretation, considering whether "substantial" should
translate to the inclusion of all major market sectors of trade, or whether it
deserves a quantitative number of the percentage of trade included. 63 In
addition to this requirement, RTAs must avoid raising trade barriers to
non-members, and they must also liberalize trade within the area by a set
deadline.64 Considering the discretion RTAs use to determine their own
standards, along with a lack of legal discipline, the GAPTI/WTO has failed
61to effectively supervise the implementation of the Article XXIV criteria.
b. RTAs Cannot be Eliminated at this Point
Multilateralism creates trade, but it also creates some disadvantages
for a wide range of developed and developing nations.66 Economic
superpowers, like the United States, find that multilateral opening creates
unwanted "competition from competitive advanced countries that produce
many of the same goods and services., 67  While multilateralism is
responsible for some trade creation, it fails to direct trade towards any
specific industry, suggesting that a more compact trade agreement may
generate faster results. 68
Political scientists attempt to pinpoint the motivation behind RTAs,
finding that functionalists view RTAs as influential responses to different
governmental needs, while providing economic benefits to all participating
69parties. Constructionists feel RTAs create a sense of collectivism and
provide communal security guarantees.70 The realist believes that RTAs
serve political aspirations, where the leading nation assumes a hegemonic
role during the creation process, similar to the United States in the
negotiation process of the FTAA.7 From an economic perspective, some
economists claim geographical proximity influences regional trade, while
others argue that regionalism is just an excuse for discriminatory trade
72policies. For smaller economies, regionalism provides an increase in their
bargaining power at a multilateral level, allowing them to start small and
learn from the power players. 3 Regardless of theory, nations enter into
63. Id. at 892.
64. Lin, supra note 59, at 33.
65. Id.
66. Altieri, supra note 19, at 852.
67. Id. at 853.
68. Id. at 850.
69. Cho, supra note 57, at 423.
70. Id. at 424.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 425.
73. Picker, supra note 9, at 276.
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RTAs to further foreign policy, improve their economies, gain access to
other members' markets, and maintain security.74 Since the 1920s, when
the British Empire transformed into a free-trade area, RTAs have granted
benefits to a variety of nations.75
Regionalism has become increasingly popular, expanding to all ends
76
of the globe. The European Union continues to grant membership to its
east, and NAFTA continues to spread further south.77 Preferential trade
areas have extended their goals to serve more than just trade in goods,
including environmental improvements, investments, services, and labor
78
markets. RTAs serve the interests of developed countries, allowing these
nations to secure domestic reforms faster on a regional level.79
c. RTA Support Erodes WTO Enthusiasm
Be it an economic powerhouse from Europe, Asia, or the Americas,
every nation desires its own preferential trade relations by establishing a
regionally exclusive setting.80 Those opposed to RTAs worry that
countries actively participating in regionalism will lose enthusiasm for
multilateralism.8' Those states that are enthusiastic or dedicated in their
support for RTAs find it impossible to support the fundamental ideals of
the WTO.8 2 It is understandable that states lost enthusiasm for the WTO
over the years, given that the WTO has more diverse members with very
diverse opinions about the future of the organization.83 Also, trade issues
have grown increasingly complex, no longer only dealing with tariff
reduction.84
In contrast to multilateralism, regionalism allows "governments a
better opportunity to affect policy."8'5 The WTO's agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) failed to adopt a Multilateral
74. Id. at 274-75.
75. Cone, supra note 32, at 571.
76. Lin, supra note 59, at 33.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 35.
80. Pitou van Dijck, FTAA: Implications for the World Trade System, in FREE TRADE
AREA FOR THE AMERICAS? THE UNITED STATES' PUSH FOR THE FTAA AGREEMENT 151,
157 (Paulo Vizentini & Marianne Wiesebron, eds., 2004).
81. Lin, supra note 59, at 35.
82. Picker, supra note 9, at 301.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 302.
85. Matthew W. Barrier, Regionalization: The Choice of a New Millennium, 9
CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 25, 30 (2000).
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Agreement on Investment (MAI), which was "designed to impose tight
restrictions on what national governments can and can not do in regulating
the economies." 86 Because the MAI would give foreign multinational
corporations legal status with political rights, governments fear loss of
sovereignty and national security.8 ' Upon the WTO's failure to adopt the
MAI, many nations realized its weak power, and reinforced their interest
in regionalism. 88
The WTO's multilateral agreement on trade in goods, GAF,
actually permits preferential trade that distorts trade patterns.89
Proponents of the GATT argue that it prevents national governments
from utilizing protectionism, limiting the freedom to discriminate against
foreign products in order to protect domestic industries. 9 Enthusiasm for
the equal protection ideas within the WTO becomes difficult to support as
the GATT legitimizes protectionist measures, providing "a laundry list of
general exceptions for all WTO members."91 It allows a state to restrict
trade where it is necessary to protect national security interests, public
morals, natural resources, human, plant, or animal life, and intellectual
property rights.92 Although these exceptions are economically justified,
the GATT's non-discrimination policy underhandedly allows states to
pursue protectionist practices that undermine the WWO. 93
2. Exception for Developing Nations: GATT Article XVIII
The GATT accords developing countries discriminatory treatment
in the form of preferential access to developed nations' markets and
market protection from domination by exports of developed countries.94
GATT Article XVIII provides economies in early stages of development,
unable to support more than a low standard of living, with the privilege to
enjoy government assistance necessary to establish particular industries,
promote these industries, and raise the general standard of living.9 These
86. Id. at 28.
87. Id. at 26.
88. Id. at 30.
89. Joel R. Paul, The New York University-University of Virginia Conference on
Exploring the Limits of International Law: Do International Trade Institutions Contribute to
Economic Growth and Development? 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 285, 327 (2003).
90. Id. at 324.
91. Id. at 326.
92. Id. at 326-27.
93. Id. at 327.
94. Garcia, supra note 5, at 989.
95. Article XVIII, in THE TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
28, 29 (GATF ed., Geneva, Switz., 1986) [hereinafter GATT, Article XVIII].
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economies may also temporarily deviate from the provisions of other
articles of the GATT in order to safeguard their external financial
positions and preserve adequate reserves for economic development.
96
Article XVIII permits the developing economies to apply new restrictions
or raise the existing restrictions as a means of protecting their infant
industries.97
B. National Treatment
Article III of the GATT calls for the application of national
treatment, which bans any domestic rule or regulation that discriminates
against imported products. 98 The language indicates that any internal
taxes, internal regulations, internal quantitative restrictions, and anything
affecting the importation of goods internally should be prevented from
protecting domestic products.99 Imports of any contracting party are to "be
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products
of national origin."'1' To determine "like product," the Appellate Body of
the WTO compares two or more products' physical properties, their use,
and their ability to be substituted for one another. 10' The products must
also be directly competitive and produced by similar processes or
production methods1°2 If one country can show that the manner in which
another contracting party operates its competition policy is discriminatory
against imports, or implicitly violates GATT or WTO policy, it is viewed as
a potential violation of the National Treatment principle. 03
Sometimes regulatory measures appear neutral or non-
discriminatory, but they have a discriminatory effecti"4 Known as de-facto
discrimination, it presents itself when "the application of formally identical
legal provisions results ... in less favourable treatment of imports."'0 5
Although many GATT panels have designed multiple tests to judge de-
96. Id. at 29, 31.
97. Id. at 31-32.
98. Peter Holmes, Trade and Competition in the New WTO Round, in TRADE
LIBERALIZATION, COMPETITION AND THE WTO 147, 161 (Chris Milner & Robert Read
eds., 2002).
99. Article III, THE TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 6
(GATT ed., Geneva, Switz., 1986) [hereinafter GATT, Article III].
100. Id.
101. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 158-59.
102. Id. at 159, 162-63.
103. Holmes, supra note 98.
104. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 173.
105. Id. at 174.
2006]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
facto discrimination, history forecasts that contracting parties will continue
to manipulate the law in hope of protecting their domestic market.
1 6
1. GATT Article XX Exception
The GATT fundamentally denounces arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination, however, Article XX provides some exceptions to the
National Treatment principle, allowing discrimination under certain
circumstances. 1°7 The exceptions allow parties to take measures necessary
to protect public morals; to protect human, animal, and plant life; and to
protect patents, trademarks, and copyrights.1 °8 These measures must be
necessary in securing compliance, and they may not discriminate between
countries arbitrarily or unjustifiably. 10 9 Countries may also protect their
national treasures, resources, and intergovernmental commodities through
government procurement, provided that they are consistent with other
provisions of the GAT 110
C. Trade Policy and Competition Policy
Generally, a nation's "trade policy is [designed] to regulate
international trade for the purpose of furthering the economic interests of
its own citizens," while a nation's competition policy strives to protect
consumers by lowering prices through promotion of competition."'
Competition policy focuses more on private, anti-competitive conduct and
governmental barriers that "impose restrictions on the freedom of
enterprises to compete., 112 The focus on private, anti-competitive conduct
takes form as abusive behavior by a monopolist, striving to restrict
competition."' The trade barriers created by the private conduct are set by
private sectors, rather than by the government. 4 Governmental barriers
to competition may be reduced or removed; however, private, anti-
106. See generally id. at 173-176 (providing a number of examples of de facto
discrimination throughout the history of the GATT/WTO).
107. Article XX, in THE TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 37
(GATT ed., Geneva, Switz., 1986) [hereinafter GATr, Article XX].
108. Id. at 37-38.
109. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 177.
110. GATT, Article XX, supra note 107, at 38.
111. Seung Wha Chang, Interaction Between Trade and Competition: Why a Multilateral
Approach for the United States? 14 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 6 (2004).
112. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 541.
113. Id.
114. Chang, supra note 111, at 2.
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competitive conduct remains harder to regulate."' Currently, national
competition laws are utilized for prohibiting and controlling anti-
competitive practices that affect international trade.116
1. Opinions on Current Policy
Open and liberal trade remains the main economic premise that
underlies the entire GATI'/WTO. 7  The multilateral trade rules
progressively removed or lowered various governmental barriers to trade,
yet private barriers have erupted, undermining the progress of the WTO.
A competition policy's goal of protecting consumers from predatory
pricing by private firms complements a liberal trade policy's goal of
reducing government trade barriers. 9 Only if private firms are inspected
by effective competition laws will trade policy achieve desired
liberalization. 0 Without enforcement of competition law, private trade
barriers will prevent consumer access to foreign imports, and damage any
gains from liberalized trade.
1 21
The WTO established a Working Group on the Interaction between
Trade and Competition (Working Group). The Working Group works
to clarify principles of non-discrimination, procedural fairness, and
transparency, while it works to gain support for the "'reinforcement of
competition institutions in developing countries through"' voluntary
cooperation. M Although the Working Group has made progress,
participants of the Cancun Ministerial Conference failed to agree on the
modalities of such negotiations, suspending any further negotiation for a
multilateral agreement on the interaction between trade policy and
114
competition. The European Community and other advocates of a
multilateral agreement on competition policy failed to convince
115. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 541.
116. Id. at 551.
117. Kevin C. Kennedy, Global Trade Issues in the New Millennium: Foreign Direct
Investment and Competition Policy at the World Trade Organization, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L
L. REV. 585, 586 (2001).
118. Id. at 587.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 588.
121. Id.
122. Chang, supra note 111, at 3.
123. Id. (quoting World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min0l_e/mindecle.htm).
124. Id. at 4.
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developing nations that the multilateral framework would benefit their
national interest.125
However, the United States took a passive and pessimistic approach
towards the negotiations. 2 6 Although multilateral trade benefits a large
number of consumers, "pointing out noticeable benefits to any single
voting block may not be easy."2 7 Consequently, most trade policies reflect
the economic goals of nations and the interests of particular groups on a
regional level.ln The developing nations sided with the United States,
129hesitating to negotiate on a multilateral level, but for differing reasons.
Most developing countries have not yet enacted a domestic competition
law, giving them reason to "believe that it is too early for them to
participate in multilateral negotiations."130
III. OVERVIEW OF THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS
As trade negotiations escalate in the Americas, they "are viewed as
a prerequisite for securing effective competition, improving positions in
foreign markets, and attracting new investments."'' Negotiations for the
Free Trade Area of the Americas began in 1994 at a meeting known as the
First Summit of the Americas."' The Free Trade Area of the Americas
includes every nation of North and South America with the exception of
Cuba.13 3 The FTAA is one free-trade bloc, sharing many similarities with
NAFTA, and opening the door for greater trading possibilities and greater
challenges.'9 It focuses on advancing economic prosperity, strengthening
the relationships between Parties, and further liberalizing trade in goods
and services, while protecting the environment, preserving cultural
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Altieri, supra note 19, at 849.
128. Id. at 849-50.
129. Chang, supra note 111, at 17.
130. Id. at 17.
131. Barrier, supra note 85, at 31.
132. Eric Dannenmaier, Trade, Democracy, and the FTAA: Public Access to the Process
of Constructing a Free Trade Area of the Americas, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1066, 1069
(2004).
133. See generally Official Website of the FTAA, at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/alca-e.asp
(last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
134. See generally Suzanne Elmilady, A Step in the Right Direction: How to Make the Free
Trade Agreement of the Americas a Cohesive Agreement that Will Better Serve Integration of
Free Trade in the Western Hemisphere, 12 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 93, 97 (2003)
(suggesting that the FTAA will face many of NAFTA's similar challenges, and that the
FTAA will follow a model similar to its sister agreement, NAFTA).
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diversity, and creating opportunities for all parties of different size and
levels of development.
The original plan for the FITAA sought to extend NAFTA to the
entire Western Hemisphere, but a more balanced negotiation plan provesS 136
closer to victory. The original agenda stated that "nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed upon," and the FTAA will work with bilateral and
regional agreements that nations previously formed within the area."' The
FTAA is attempting to harmonize the NAFTA and MERCOSUR
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) agreements; however, both
agreements follow different regional. integration strategies. 38  While
MERCOSUR concentrates on forming a customs. union and providing
equality to its members, NAFTA allows the United States to pursue its
own trade goals and maintain more influence and power over Canada and
Mexico. 9 The FTAA proposal also integrates parts of "the Andean
Community ('CAN'), the Caribbean Community ('CARICOM'), [and] the
Central American Common Market ('MCCA')."' 4  Although its reach
extends continentally, the FTAA has a planetary scope, striving to create a
"new order [of] American power.''141
Because of high U.S. demands, negotiations have not gone as
142
smoothly as planned. Larger economies, like Brazil, insist that the
United States concede more during negotiations, while smaller economiesS141
are less resistant to their requests.. While Chapter V of the FTAA
agreement promises to make deferential treatment for countries of
different development levels a fundamental principle,'" the power struggle
and extensive range of resources in the Western Hemisphere possibly form
135. Free Trade Area of the Americas Draft Agreement, ch. 1, Nov. 21, 2003, available at
http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ftaadraft03/Chapterl-e.asp (last visited Feb. 4, 2006) [hereinafter
FTAA].
136. Carranza, supra note 7, at 1030.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 1031.
140. Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Sustainable Development in the Negotiation of the
FTAA, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1118, 1133 (2004).
141. Vizentini, supra note 1, at 11.
142. Jacqueline Granados, Investor Protection and Foreign Investment Under NAFTA
Chapter 11: Prospects for the Western Hemisphere Under Chapter 17 of the FTAA, 13
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 189, 212 (2005).
143. Id. at 212-13.
144. FTAA, supra note 135, ch. 5.
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the greatest obstacle to achieving a balanced agreement among thirty-four
145
nations.
A. The Flexible FTAA
Due to the many obstacles and concerns raised by the initial
negotiations of the FTAA, the trade ministers from the participating
141
countries approved the Miami Declaration on November 20, 2003. In
the Miami Declaration, the trade ministers agreed to continue
negotiations, but the declaration proposed "a more flexible, but also
diluted, FTAA.',147 The Declaration allows countries to choose different
commitment levels, while also permitting plurilateral negotiations within
the FTAA for those who desire additional benefits and obligations.
148
Although it supports a broad-based FTAA, seeking a common, balanced
set of rules and regulations for each country, the declaration allows
countries to opt-out of some of the obligations in any of the negotiation
149
areas.
The Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) sits at the top of the
FTAA's structure, ensuring that "negotiations move in the same direction"
and providing an environment that allows all countries to fully participate
in the process.15° Beneath the TCN, general negotiation committees
responsible for negotiations in the FIFAA include market access,
investment, services, government procurement, dispute settlement,
agriculture, intellectual property, subsidies, antidumping, countervailing
duties, and competition policy.' Smaller, specialized committees, unlike
the negotiation groups, focus on important issues of a delicate nature.
They receive input from different representatives of civil society, and they
focus on the future of smaller economies (The Consultative Group on
153Smaller Economies). In an attempt to combine NAFTA, MERCOSUR,
145. Carranza, supra note 7, at 1031-32.
146. Id. at 1054.
147. Id.
148. Free Trade Area of the Americas, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2003,
available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Ministerials/Miami/Miami-e.asp (last visited Feb. 5,
2006).
149. Carranza, supra note 7, at 1054.
150. Michel Duquette & Maxime Rondeau, The Puzzle of Institutionalizing a Free Market
Continental Zone: The Nuts and Bolts of the FTAA, in FREE TRADE FOR THE AMERICAS?
THE UNITED STATES' PUSH FOR THE FIAA AGREEMENT 59, 62 (Paulo Vizentini &
Marianne Wiesebron eds., 2004).
151. Segger, supra note 140, at 1186-87.
152. Duquette & Rondeau, supra note 150, at 68.
153. Id.
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and the remainder of the Western Hemisphere, the declaration, in essence,
permits countries to reject either agreement's trade disciplines.5
B. Problems with the Flexible FTAA
1. Smaller Economies vs. the U.S. Economy
One of the FTAA's greatest challenges centers on the small and
vulnerable economies. Tariff reduction and production center
consolidation will likely cause revenue and job loss, respectively. 5 6 "[A]
single catastrophic event, e.g., an economic, social, or natural disaster," will
negatively impact a developing nation or one with a small economy more
significantly than a large, diversified nation. 57 The IFTAA agreement has
yet to specifically state what special and deferential treatment the smaller
economies will receive.
Although the FITAA recognizes the difference in economic size of
all the member nations, the asymmetrical distribution of power continues
to cause tension.'9 For the United States, which has an economy almost
100 times greater than all of the Central American and Caribbean
countries combined, the FTAA offers many opportunities for big
businesses and the federal government. 16° Because the United States has
the ability to mold continental integration in its favor, no other FTAA
member can individually challenge any action taken by the United
161States. With a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of nine trillion
dollars, thirty-four percent of the world's GDP per capita, and twenty-nine
percent of the world's market, the relatively low-populated United States
remains unchallenged for such reasons. 16' The United States has the ability
to participate in simultaneous negotiations involving regional and bilateral
agreements, as well as WTO multilateral negotiations. 163 The nations withlittle economic power lack the same resources necessary to engage in
154. Carranza, supra note 7, at 1054-55.
155. P.J. Patterson, Caribbean Perspective: The Free Trade Area of the Americas and
Smaller Economies, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 899, 900 (2004).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 903.
158. FrAA, ch. 5.1.3, supra note 135.
159. Carranza, supra note 7, at 1032.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1033.
162. Segger, supra note 140, at 1128.
163. Altieri, supra note 18, at 851.
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multiple negotiations, often finding themselves at the mercy of the powerplayers. 164
While many less developed countries face low economic growth in
the global community, some have been entirely excluded from regional
trade blocs. In the FTAA, however, lesser developed, Latin American
economies would annex to the U.S. economy in a similar fashion as
NAFFA.'66 One possible theory for annexation is that the smaller
economies will receive more benefits than the hegemon of the group (the
United States) because the hegemon will act as the leader "for the
emergence of a stable international regime of free trade."'67  Other
theories predict that the United States and Canada will gain more benefits
than Latin American countries due to discriminatory liberalization, which
more powerful nations tend to practice and the lesser developed rarely
challenge.' This suggests that the IFTAA will allow the United States to
keep poor nations' domestic goods out of its market.1
61
2. The FTAA's Size Causes Controversy
A free-trade area consisting of all the countries in the Western
Hemisphere, with the exception of Cuba, makes the FTAA the largest and
most diverse free trade area in the world. 70 In fact, no other trade
negotiation "has ever been launched on the basis of such a heterogeneous
set of countries.,17' Negotiations have consisted of NAF-A members and
members of the Southern Common Market, MERCOSUR, led by the
United States and Brazil respectively. Latin America widely opposes the
FTAA, perceiving it to only serve big businesses and narrow-minded, free-
173
market economies.
The current FTAA Draft Agreement stresses the importance of
using existing international standards, uniform technical regulations, and
conformity assessment in all areas that could affect trade among the
164. Id. at 852.
165. Lin, supra note 59, at 33.
166. Carranza, supra note 7, at 1032.
167. Id. at 1038.
168. Id.
169. Altieri, supra note 19, at 868.
170. Jessica S. Wiltse, Comment, An Investor-State Dispute Mechanism in the Free Trade
Area of the Americas: Lessons from NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 51 BuFF. L. REv. 1145, 1149
(2003).
171. Rubens Antonio Barbosa, Latin American Perspective: The Free Trade Area of the
Americas and Brazil, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1017, 1019-1020 (2004).
172. Wiltse, supra note 170, at 1173.
173. Barbosa, supra note 171, at 1039.
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parties. 74 After considering the time this would consume and the
possibility of never reaching common ground, Brazil proposed that new
rules and topics that are highly sensitive to certain parties be negotiated
multilaterally, or among those with conflicting opinions, but not at a
• •175
hemispheric level.
a. Conflict Among the Many Members
While success of the FTAA will solidify the United States' dominant
position in global trade, multiple parties refuse to cooperate with theS176
agenda. Smaller economies show less resistance to the U.S. terms and
willingness to pursue the FTAA, while stronger economies are not as
compliant.'77 The United States also hopes to gain access to Brazil, the
largest asset of MERCOSUR, and the tenth largest economy in theI/179
world. However, Brazil wishes to pursue its own agenda, often
frustrating the group objectives.'8 Reviewing its past behavior, Brazil
abandoned negotiations between MERCOSUR and the Andean
Community. 181 Because Brazil showed a lack of cooperation on a sub
regional level and opposed hemispheric unification, it may pose a threat to
182a larger conglomerate like the FTAA.
In addition to conflicts among the members, Brazil, the United
States, and Canada have demonstrated signs of internal conflict through
lack of dedication and enthusiasm to the entire FTAA group.' 83 The
United States and Canada recently considered exclusive negotiations
between the four MERCOSUR members and themselves.' 84  When
Mexico realized its possible exclusion from these negotiations, it lost
185respect for the group. Support for the trade agreement continues to
hover somewhere in the middle, as "public concern and mistrust relating to
new trade agreements" has steadily increased over the years.' 86 This public
174. FTAA, supra note 135, at ch. 13, arts. 2, 7.
175. Barbosa, supra note 171, at 1021.
176. Joe Zopolsky, Implementing the FTAA: A Survey of Hemispheric Unification Efforts
Within the Americas Over the Past Ten Years, 9 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 91 (2000).
177. Granados, supra note 142, at 212.
178. Carranza, supra note 7, at 1034.
179. Granados, supra note 142, at 212.
180. Zopolsky, supra note 176, at 95.
181. Id.




186. Segger, supra note 140, at 1205.
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concern and mistrust surfaces in the citizens of the United States, despite
187the fact that their government has positively promoted the FTAA. The
lack of attention given to the social and environmental aspects of trade and
the lack of information given to the public take most of the responsibility
for the mistrust of new trade agreements."g
b. Outsiders' Response
Those outside the FTAA negotiations may first respond by
establishing other preferential trading regions to build a "'level playing
field' with the major players in the Americas.' '189 Another strategy they
may employ to counter the effects of the FTAA would involve a new
WTO round, attempting to reduce the "potential discriminating effects
and trade [diversion] consequences.' 19° Through this WTO round, the
outsiders would attempt to render the concessions and agreements of the
FTAA multilateral. T9 Not surprisingly, the EU poses the greatest
opposition to American desires, striving to "counterbalance and prevent
the United States from exacting the preferential terms it wants."'
92
3. Workers Get No Guarantees
Although trade boosts economic growth and national income, it
does not necessarily create new employment for the workers who will
compete with imports, and ultimately lose.193 "[T]he distribution of
benefits and burdens within the trading system will be skewed in favor of
the dominant party. 1 94 The American Federation of Labor-Congress of
Industrial Unions (AFL-CIO) compares the negative impacts of NAFTA
on domestic markets with the possibilities of similar results from the
FTAA 9 5 While the FTAA proposes exclusive new rights to multinational
corporations, it does not guarantee any rights of workers, small businesses,
187. Zopolsky, supra note 176, at 98.
188. Segger, supra note 140, at 1205.
189. Dijck, supra note 80, at 157.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Altieri, supra note 19, at 849.
193. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 23, at 9.
194. Garcia, supra note 5, at 988.
195. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR-CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION,
TIME TO CHOOSE: GOOD JOBS AND STRONG COMMUNITIES OR NAFTA TIMES TEN? 1,
available at http://www.aflcio.org/issues/j obseconomy/globaleconomy/upload/Time-to-
Choose-Good-Jobs-and-Strong-Communities-or-NAFTA-Times-Ten.pdf (last visited Jan.
27, 2006).
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and the unemployed.1 96 Domestic market supporters fear that the FTAA
will only benefit multinational corporations that wish to outsource work to
cheaper markets and destroy good jobs in their home country.1 97 In the
same way that NAFTA failed to create a healthy economy in Mexico,
these same supporters share a similar worry that the FTAA will keep
economic development out of reach for poorer countries in LatinAmerica. 19
Brazil furthers this fear by complaining that the United States
heavily subsidizes its agriculture and creates barriers on Brazilian
imports.' 99 Latin America and the Caribbean concur that the free-trade
area will give U.S. multinationals free reign over their home markets and
destroy domestic businesses.200  They are concerned that high
environmental and labor standards will harm the competitive level of Latin
American and Caribbean businesses.21 The possibility of Canada or the
United States using environmental, or social provisions as a form of
protectionism, fails to earn much confidence from the FTAA.2 °2 Despite
the fears expressed by the poorer countries, Latin America may follow the
U.S. lead and support the FTAA, panicking that they may be excluded
from a group which "grants preferential access to the U.S. market, one of
the largest markets in the world."20 3 Social and political opposition and
other hurdles stand in the path of the FTAA, yet, it continues to gain
momentum from pressures within the United States.2
C. The FTAA Gets Big Business Vote
Recognized mostly for their labor intensive goods and small
economies, Latin America openly opposed the FTAA, branding it "a
narrow, free-market oriented agreement, 'a brainchild of big business,
whose interests it would serve from start to finish."'' 20 5  The lesser
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2.
198. Id.
199. Joseph Mann, South Florida Businesses Support Free Trade Area, SOUTH FLORIDA
SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 14, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WL 12446914.
200. Id.
201. Segger, supra note 140, at 1131.
202. Id.
203. Carranza, supra note 7, at 1041.
204. Dorval Brunelle, The US, the FTAA, and the Parameters of Global Governance, in
FREE TRADE FOR THE AMERICAS? THE UNITED STATES' PUSH FOR THE FTAA
AGREEMENT 23, 37 (Paulo Vizentini & Marianne Wiesebron eds., 2004).
205. Carranza, supra note 7, at 1039 (citing William Finnegan, The Economics of Empire:
Notes on the Washington Consensus, 306 HARPER'S MAGAZINE, May 2003, at 41, 49).
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developed countries of South and Central America fear that the FTAA's
trade liberalization goal will only encourage structural inequalities and
strengthen income disparities. 206 As a result of NAFTA, the Mexican
economy increased overall, but domestic growth declined, which leaves
these countries wary about the FTAA 20 7 Mexico's NAIFTA experience
indicates that the FTAA will not likely produce the same benefits for Latin
America that it will for the United States, unless the United States opens
its market to other's agricultural and industrial exports.2°'
On the contrary, when analyzing the different sectors of the
Mexican economy, NAFTA brought improvements in the areas of
inflation, deficit, and fiscal and monetary policies. 209  The Mexican
multinational companies' economies are growing, which serves as one of
the main reasons why big businesses support the FTAA.2'0 The Latin
American Banking Federation strongly supports the FTAA because it
would increase Latin banks' volume of services and trade.21 The Latin
American Banking Federation and Thomas P. Noonan, president of
Florida International Bankers Association, predict that the FTAA will
yield similar results as NAFTA, which doubled the size of the Mexican
212Economy. To much surprise, even the Brazilian business community
shows support for the FTAA.21' Brazilian businesses reason that if they
remain outside the FTAA, they would lose a substantial share of the U.S.
214
market; a concern shared by many potential members of the FTAA.
1. Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
Multinational Corporations make up roughly 70 percent of all world
trade. 21' Regional trade agreements have proved a powerful investment
216tool for MNCs as trade and investment continue to grow inseparable.
On a regional level, MNCs have "the ability to exploit all the existing
206. Elmilady, supra note 134, at 97.
207. Id.
208. Carranza, supra note 7, at 1038.
209. Elmilady, supra note 134, at 98.
210. Id.
211. Susan Stabley, Latin Bank Group Gives Support to FTAA, MIAMI TODAY, Nov. 13,
2003, available at http://www.miamitodaynews.com/news/031113/story2.shtml.
212. Id.
213. See Raymond Buve, Conclusions, in FREE TRADE FOR THE AMERICAS? THE UNITED
STATES' PUSH FOR THE FTAA AGREEMENT 197, 204-205 (Paulo Vizentini & Marianne
Wiesebron eds., 2004).
214. Id. at 204
215. Barrier, supra note 85, at 25.
216. Id.
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advantages of scale in their regional facilities," providing protection from
outside competition.2 Countries prefer regional trade agreements over
multilateral agreements because they fear foreign-owned MNCs in their
territory, which may possibly threaten national security.21 A Multilateral
Agreement on Investment, which would allow MNCs to take advantage of
global investment in nearly every country, will not likely gain support due
to possible "loss of culture as tastes, practices, and ideas move across
borders." 219 To combat the concerns of MNCs, governments must provide
the means to protect investment, which explains the trend to switch to
regionalism. 20 The FTAA attempts to fashion its investment protection
plan after NAFTA chapter 11,221 by "establish[ing] a dispute resolution
mechanism.., between a party and an investor of another party. 2 22 While
the exact level of protection remains uncertain, "the FTAA attempts to
achieve a homogeneous legal framework that promotes intra-hemispheric
investment.,
2 3
"[A] large [percentage] of world trade occurs within a multinational
[corporation]. 224 In the United States, a significant number of exports and
225imports are traded intrafirm. Multinationals establish subsidiaries in
other countries where parts can be cheaply produced, and they import
from, or export to these establishments, depending on the corporation's
226pattern of trade. Many U.S. MNCs, concerned with their competitive
position on a global level, support this larger free-trade area. 7 U.S.
businesses hope the FTAA will help combat competition from EU firms
by securing the Western Hemisphere in a single trade area and erecting "a
common external tariff wall."'2 MNCs also anticipate the establishment of
trade courts within Latin America where they would be allowed to sue the
229governments for health, labor, or environmental violations. If aNAFTA-style FTAA succeeds, U.S. government and big businesses will
217. Id. at 26.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 27.
221. Granados, supra note 142, at 222.
222. Brunelle, supra note 204, at 30.
223. Granados, supra note 142, at 224.
224. Paul, supra note 89, at 295 (discussing the importance of the role of multinational
corporations in international trade).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Altieri, supra note 19, at 868.
228. Id.
229. Carranza, supra note 7, at 1032.
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obtain access to the MERCOSUR market.2 30 Because MNCs have
extreme confidence in the MERCOSUR economies, they gladly entertain
this possibility.231
D. Benefits if the FTAA were to Succeed
The FTAA negotiations failed to conclude in January 2005, but
hemispheric political leaders maintain that the FTAA will create
opportunities for all of the nations of the Americas, taking into account the
232different levels of development and economic potential 2. The FTAA
groups the most powerful economies with some of the smallest and
poorest, and includes middle-income Latin American economies with the
power to pursue individual strategies in the global economy.233 If agreed
upon, the FTAA will surpass the structure of any other free-trade zone,
including the multilateral trade regime of the WTO.23
1. Small Economies Gain from a Hegemon
Following the Cold War, the United States needed a means to
reaffirm its worldwide dominance. 235 The United States sought exclusive
economic space and made efforts to increase exports in order to face the
236
challenges presented by the EU and East Asia. From this dilemma
eventually rose NAFTA, reaffirming U.S. hegemony as it exercised control
and authority over less developed nations.237 In order to continue a strong
level of global involvement, "[t]he American strategy evolved from
containment to enlargement and engagement, as" it began actively
pursuing the FTAA.23s The United States is considered an international
hegemon, enforcing its rules and openly pursuing its goals
internationally.239  "[H]egemonic stability theory [predicts] that smaller
States gain even more than the international hegemon when the latter
provides.., leadership [necessary] for.., a stable international regime of
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1034.
232. Myrtle D. Bishop & Samuel J. Chandler, Caribbean Perspective: Opportunities and
Challenges: The Caribbean Involvement in the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 27
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 909, 913 (2004).
233. Id. at 913-14.
234. Id. at 914.
235. Vizentini, supra note 1, at 14.
236. Id.
237. See id.
238. Id. at 14-16.
239. See Carranza, supra note 7, at 1037.
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free trade."2 40 Leaders in the FTAA negotiations established the
Consultative Group on Smaller Economies to review and convey the
concerns and interests of smaller economies to the Trade Negotiation
Committee. 24'
The Caribbean countries of the CARICOM Single Market
Economy became involved with the FTAA due to the fact that other
participants were to accord special and deferential treatment to the
242developing economies. The Caribbean community has insisted that
special and deferential treatment be accepted and offered by all
negotiating partners, and that developed nations view it "as an important
set of policy instruments," not just as a concession. 24  In Article XIII,
Chapter XIII of the third draft of the FTAA Declaration, the parties are
required to implement technical assistance programs and provide financial
cooperation for developing economies.244 The assistance should strengthen
institutions and improve infrastructure in order to level the playing field
and destroy technical barriers to trade.2
2. Everyone Gains from a Hegemon
The combination of a growing WTO and a broadening agenda
246further complicates multilateral negotiations. In a regional trading area,
like the FTAA, a limited membership combined with the significant power
of a hegemon will likely produce fast results.24' Analysis of other regional
248
agreements, such as NAFTA, illustrates a RTA's powerful force.
NAFTA led to an increase in international competitiveness in all three
economies, and attracted an inward flow of investment.24' As a result,
Mexico has a positive trade balance due to its increase in exports to the
United States, which is twice than Brazil's total exports to the United
240. Id. at 1038.
241. Bishop & Chandler, supra note 232, at 912.
242. Id. at 923.
243. Id.
244. FTAA, supra note 135, at art. 13.
245. Id.
246. Dijck, supra note 80, at 153.
247. Id.
248. Peter F. Allgeier, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, Remarks at the Brazil Summit
2004, U.S.-Brazil Relations in the Context of the FTAA Negotiations in New York (Apr.
27, 2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/USTR-Deputy-Speeches/2004/asset-upload
_file109_4408.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
249. Id.
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States.250 NAFTA also created millions of jobs in Mexico and increased
wages for export-oriented workers. 25' The cooperation among members
with the economic reforms and other disciplines required by NAFTA
explains much of its success, and convinced the United States that the
thirty-four contracting parties to the FTAA could benefit from a similar
252
agreement.
Although Brazil has demonstrated little support for the FTAA,
Brazil is aware that non-participation in a successful FTAA would cause
severe consequences: in foreign trade.253 The United States would gain
market-share by exporting to Latin America, while Brazil would lose this
market-share to the United States.5 " In the past few years, Brazil
increased its exports to the United States, resulting in a trade surplus,
which Brazil continues to maintain.2" Brazilian businesses and the
Brazilian government realized the importance of the United States
presence and investment in Brazil; therefore, "it is unrealistic to ignore the
necessity of working out free-trade agreements with the US. '256 Brazil-
U.S. trade relations have evolved from diametrically opposing one
257
another, to serving as co-chairs of the FTAA negotiation process.
IV. THE WTO LOSES INFLUENCE
As regionalism continues to spread quickly at the expense of
multilateralism, the world trading system transforms into one consisting
solely of preferential trading areas. 25 Although regional trade agreements,
like the FTAA, oppose the underlying principles of the WTO and GATT,
the WTO and GATT continue to encourage their formation. The
FTAA may trigger new discriminatory trade-policy initiatives regionally,
where member "countries participat[e] in several overlapping but
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to enjoy the benefits offered by WTO membership, every member must
assume the responsibility to uphold the promises made during the
negotiation process.26' However, opening its doors to countries with
different economic systems and "radically different institutional
arrangements in their economic structures" exonerates members of ever
262truly upholding every promise in the same manner as the next.
Reconfirming its pessimistic view, the United States doubts the
WTO's ability to handle certain matters effectively in the future,
particularly negotiations for a multilateral competition policy.2 63  The
United States always doubted the influence and success of the WTO as it
insisted on using its own court systems and resolutions in response to
breaches of trade agreements. 264  Although the European Community
continues to back the WTO by submitting various proposals to the
Competition Working Group and by taking a leading role in various areas,
the developing nations tend to follow the U.S. lead.265
The United States plays a significant role in the erosion of
enthusiasm for the WTO.266  Those who support multilateral trade
development criticized the United States for re-directing its energies
towards a bilateral, or regional trading system.267  The United States
exhausts its energy on regional trade agreements, like its current
involvement in the FTAA negotiations, preventing its ability to participate
in and support multilateral negotiations, which is detrimental to the
268WTO's current rounds of negotiations. Other member nations of
various RTAs also take responsibility for the "[i]nstitutional harm [that]
occurs when countries resort to bilateral or regional agreements rather
261. Michael K. Young, Symposium, Global Trade Issues in the New Millennium: Lessons
from the Battle Front: U.S. -Japan Trade Wars and their Impact on the Multilateral Trading
System, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 753, 756 (2001).
262. Id. (questioning the flexibility and openness of the WTO and its ability to maintain a
uniform structure in such an environment).
263. Chang, supra note 111, at 18 (suggesting that the United States' position on the
WTO will play a major role in the WTO's possible demise).
264. Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Charting the Transnational Dimension of Law: U.S. Free Trade
Agreements as Benchmarks of Globalization, 27 Hous. J. INT'L L. 47, 64 (2004).
265. See generally Chang, supra note 111, at 18 (the developing nations would rather have
something secure to fall back on, such as the U.S., rather than representing their own
interests on a multilateral level).
266. See generally Colin Picker, Reputational Fallacies in International Law: A
Comparative Review of United States and Canadian Trade Actions, 67 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 85
(2004) (suggesting that the U.S. has a reputation in the world trading system for.pursuing its
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than multilateral agreements, resulting in the expenditure of significantly
more of a country's limited negotiating resources on [RTAs] than on the
ongoing WTO negotiations., 269 The WTO's development will slow to a
crawl as countries reach their trade goals through RTAs.27°
A. Protectionism Still Prevalent
The GATT consists of multiple international rules, but it contains
•• 271
almost an equal number of exceptions. It permits a member nation to
protect its national security interests through any action considered
272
necessary. The most significant exception to the GATT principles allows
members of customs unions and free-trade areas to grant preferential
273tariffs on imports from other member states. These regional agreements
are inconsistent with non-discrimination and the idea of comparative
274
advantage, benefiting those included and harming those excluded.
U.S. protectionism traces back to the pre-WTO era, when its
strength prevented the approval for the International TradeO • .• 275
Organization. The United States also obtained a GATT waiver for
276
agricultural subsidies. As the establishment of the GATT removed
tariffs and other non-tariff barriers, the number of private trade barriers
became more evident.277 Non-tariff and non-quota barriers include safety
and health standards, licensing requirements, and other domestic measures
that discourage the importation of goods and services.278 As the WTO
considers its possible role in a future agreement on competition policy, the1 279
United States remains hesitant. The United States maintains the
concern that "codification of competition rules at the WTO level would
result in... a compromise in substantive standards for antitrust regulations
269. Id. at 86.
270. Id. at 85.
271. See generally THE TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
(GATT ed., Geneva, Switz., 1986) [hereinafter GATT], available at
www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/06-gatt.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2006)
(nearly every article that contains rules and regulations is accompanied by an article
containing an exception).
272. Paul, supra note 89, at 327.
273. Id. at 326.
274. Id. at 327.
275. PALMETER, supra note 29, at 119.
276. Id.
277. Young, supra note 261, at 769.
278. Id.
279. Chang, supra note 111, at 16.
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so as to make them available for other developing countries.,,280 Further,
the United States believes that legal tools, such as unilateral or bilateral
agreements, will more effectively resolve trade related competition
conflicts, compared with multilateral agreements.28'
The GATT's "dumping" provisions invite protectionist behavior
through the granting of broad discretion to importing nations allowing
them to determine when goods are sold for less than cost, to determine
whether the importation caused a material injury, and to determine the
282appropriate countervailing duty necessary to repair such injury. GATT
Article VI allows a country to determine whether the effect of dumping or
subsidizing caused a material injury to a domestic industry, or whether it
283materially retarded the establishment of a domestic industry. A similar
form of disguised protectionism, countervailing duties, gives importing
nations the authority to determine "whether a foreign government's
actions are a subsidy.,
28
Some theories suggest that the level of protection for intellectual
property rights may be overly protective.2 Industrialized nations protect
most of their exports by trademark, patent, or copyright, using these
intangible devices to convince consumers that their quality surpasses
substitutable goods. The WTO's anti-competitive trade regime "requires
members to prohibit competition, benefiting exporters of protected
products in industrialized countries," which is embodied in the Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. 287
The agreement obligates all members to adopt laws conforming to
international treaties, sets a high minimum standard for intellectual
property rights, creates a standard for protection and enforcement, and
requires the use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to settle
disputes among WTO members.28 Unfortunately for the lesser developed
280. Id. at 16-17.
281. Id. at 17.
282. Paul, supra note 89, at 331; see also MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 303 (The
term "dumping" refers to "sales below cost," usually caused by intense competition in the
market, a decline in demand in the market due to recession, forward pricing, or predatory
pricing, all of which cause a material injury to a domestic industry).
283. See Article IV, in THE TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
41, 41-44 (GATT ed., Geneva, Switz., 1986) [hereinafter GATT, Article IV], available at
www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/06-gatt.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
284. Paul, supra note 89, at 332.
285. Id. at 329.
286. Id. at 330.
287. Id.
288. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 397-98.
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countries, TRIPS provides another form of protectionism heavily used by
strong economies, and subtly allows discrimination which violates the
National Treatment principle.8 9
1. Private Barriers to Entry
The GATT system only dealt with public barriers to trade, ignoring
the private trade barriers employed by private businesses.2 9 If private
barriers to trade remain unchecked through the absence of an effective
competition policy, the WTO's trade policy goal (to liberalize and open
markets) will fail.291 "[T]he current WTO ... does not have legally binding
rules that effectively address trade-restrictive anticompetitive practices.
29
Although trade policy promotes trade, it also protects trade by providing
trade remedy laws, serving protectionist purposes by allowing domestic
293industries to correct injuries they received from unfair pricing practices.
The extent to which the domestic producers can apply trade remedy laws,
and the extent to which these remedy laws unfairly affect competition
294
remains largely unregulated .
Private barriers often surface in the form of patents, know-how
agreements, or some other type of intangible licensing agreement.9 For
example, a licensor may require a licensee to purchase components needed
to produce products under a patent from the licensor or a third party that
296the licensor designates. Also, a licensor may deprive the licensee of any
incentive to develop new technology by requiring the latter to concede any
297improved technologies. Although different countries have different
opinions on restrictive business practices, the TRIPS agreement, designed
specifically to regulate intellectual property, recognizes that some practices
will continue to adversely affect "trade and may impede the transfer and
dissemination of technology.
291
289. See generally Paul, supra note 89, at 329-30 (discussing the fact that protection of
intellectual property rights and ideas costs developing countries enough to where larger
economies are able to protect the intellectual property market from the less developed).
290. Chang, supra note 111, at 13.
291. Kennedy, supra note 115, at 588.
292. Chang, supra note 111, at 34.
293. Kennedy, supra note 117, at 589.
294. Id. at 589-590.
295. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 435.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 436.
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2. Breaching of Trade Agreements
An enduring problem with international trade relations resides in
how one should punish a losing respondent in a claim for breach of trade
agreement. 299 In a slightly subtle way, the WTO allows for protectionism
once again. 3°° NAFTA follows a system created by the GAT and WTO,
which permits the winner of a claim for breach to "withhold[] a
compensatory amount of trade benefits that NAFTA otherwise requires
the winner to concede."3 °1 Also, the loser may "pay an annual monetary
assessment" similar to a prepaid fee that equals half of the otherwise
suspendible benefits, which the U.S. may use in all of its future trade
302
agreements.
The current draft agreement of the FTAA furthers the idea of
"suspension of benefits," allowing the injured party to suspend benefits up
to a certain level decided upon by an established neutral panel or the
Appellate Body of the FTAA dispute settlement system. 30 3 The draft
agreement provides the potential parties with much discretion as to what
the injured party may consider when applying procedures and suspending
benefits.3°4 Another ambiguity in the agreement, allowing "modification of
measures for the suspension of benefits... if justified," lets the party
complained against justify why they deserve more protection.
3. Nations Ignore Prohibition of Protectionism
In the world trade system, nations acquire a wide spectrum of
reputations, depending on their tendency to obey or disobey the rules. 3°6
Although protectionism is prohibited, states such as the U.S. and Canada
show little shame when employing domestic trade remedies and providing
subsidies in a manner which results in protectionism.307 "[G]ood players [in





299. Murphy, supra note 264, at 64-65.
300. See generally id. at 65 (providing another example where the WTO allows the winner
of a trade dispute to punish the losing respondent with much of its own discretion).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. FTAA, supra note 135, at ch. 23, arts. 33.1, 33.2.
304. See id. at arts. 33.3, 33.4, 33.5, 33.6.
305. See id. at art. 33.7.
306. See generally Picker, supra note 266, at 72-76 (for a discussion of the reputations
nations acquire, including trade related reputations, and their effect on international law).
307. Id. at 97-99.
308. Id. at 96.
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B. RTAs Have Their Own Agenda
1. Free Trade Area of the Americas
Like the WTO, the Western Hemisphere will have its own code of
conduct, regulating segments from subsidies to intellectual property rights,
and from dispute settlement to competition policies.3 0 In most chapters of
the FTAA Draft Agreement, the text recognizes that "the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization... govern[s] the
rights and obligations of the Parties" unless otherwise provided in said
chapter.310 It appears that the WTO takes a back seat to the FIAA when
the Draft Agreement allows for express provisions to provide alternative
rules and obligations than those provided by the WTO.31'
The FTAA negotiations on subsidies disapprove of "perverse
subsidies" that harm social development, the environment, or the
economy. 12 On the other hand, some substantial economic sectors in the
Americas remain heavily subsidized, particularly the agriculture, energy,
and transportation sectors.313  The negotiations seek to further the
application of "the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures and [possibly] ... to improve... 'the operation and application
of trade remedy laws' within the [Western] [H]emisphere. '' 314 Although
the FIAA Draft Agreement supports the WTO in the area of subsidies,S 315
the text was written to guide and protect the members of the region.
In regard to intellectual property rights, the FTAA provides
proscriptive measures explaining what the countries should do, as opposed
to other rules describing what countries should not do.31' The DraftAgreement promotes technological innovation in the Americas and
309. See generally Segger, supra note 140, at 1183-1204 (illustrating the sustainable
development in the FTAA negotiations in the areas or subsidies, intellectual property
rights, and competition policy).
310. See generally FTAA, supra note 135, at ch. 15, § A, art. 2 (This chapter, as well as
nearly all others of the draft agreement, provide for recognition of the WTO, which
governs the rights and obligations of the parties, unless the FTAA provides otherwise).
311. Id.
312. Segger, supra note 140, at 1187.
313. Id. at 1188.
314. Bishop & Chandler, supra note 232, at 911 (citing Free Trade Area of the Americas:
Fourth Trade Ministerial Meeting, Declaration of Ministers, ann. II, San Jose, Costa Rica,
Mar. 19, 1998, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials/SanJose/SanJose-e.asp); see
also MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 264. (SCM defines a subsidy and provides three
categories of subsidies, allowing some and not others).
315. See FTAA, supra note 135, at ch. 15.
316. Segger, supra note 140, at 1190.
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encourages the transfer and dissemination of technology within the
region.317 The Draft Agreement also requires that future members
continue to give effect to previous WTO intellectual property agreements,
and that each country accord National Treatment and Most-Favored
Nation status to other members of the FTAA.3 1 s
Furthermore, the Draft Agreement establishes a dispute settlement
process unique to only FTAA members in order to preserve the rights and
obligations of the parties under the Agreement.9 The Agreement
provides for a "neutral panel" upon the request of a party in consultation,
consisting of members that "have expertise ... in: law, international trade,
other matters covered by this Agreement, or the resolution of disputes
arising under international trade agreements., 320 The drafters wrote the
Agreement in hope of giving effective access to all FTAA members to the
dispute settlement process, recognizing the needs of lesser developed
countries, providing several choices of forums, and catering to the various
needs of all parties.32'
Chapter XIX of the Draft Agreement, discussing competition
policy, fails to make any reference to the WTO.321 It asks that each party
"adopt or maintain competition laws or regulations, at a national or
subregional level, to proscribe anticompetitive .. conduct... [so as to
promote] economic efficiency and consumer welfare. ' ' 32 Consistent with
other chapters, this chapter provides exceptions, and a committee on
competition, designed to monitor the progress and problems that might
324
occur in the FTAA . The variety of size and economic development in
the FTAA suggests that the FTAA needs a strong competition policy
prepared to help small producers enter a monopolistic market and to
discipline those overstepping their boundaries. 32' Because international
competition laws emerged less than a decade ago, the FTAA has the
opportunity to group economic objectives and non-economic public policy
goals into its competition policy.26 The youth of international competition
317. FTAA, supra note 135, at ch. 20 § A, art. 2.1.
318. Id. at § A, arts. 2, 5 and § B, art. 1.
319. FTAA, supra note 135, at ch. 23, § A, art. 5.
320. Id. at § B, art. 12.3.
321. Id. at arts. 6, 7, 8.
322. See generally, FTAA, supra note 135, at ch. 19 (neglecting to reference the WTO in
the chapter).
323. See id. at § B, art. 6.
324. See id. at § B, art. 7 and § C, art. 12.
325. Segger, supra note 140, at 1198-1199.
326. Id.
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laws gives the FTAA a chance to compete with the WTO in exploring and
327developing internal laws.
The FTAA strives to be WTO compatible, yet it surpasses every
structure that has been contemplated by other regional trading blocs.3'2 In
general, regional trade agreements further economic, security, and foreign
policy goals,3 9 yet, the Agreement is designed to apply rules in areas that
"have never been successfully incorporated into the multilateral trade
negotiations," such as competition, investment, and government
procurement.3 Because GATT principles of Most-Favored Nation and
National Treatment are greatly abused through the many exceptions that
the GATT provides, the FTAA will ultimately lead to the erosion of the
WTO as it pursues its own goals and objectives.331 "Article XXIV has
proven weak and irrelevant over the decades," and only continues to
support exceptions that will benefit the members of the FTAA, providing
332nearly an entire hemisphere with special and deferential treatment.
Despite the lack of enthusiasm that the FTAA conveys for the WTO, the
FTAA, "while having to be WTO compatible, can be WTO-plus in terms
of both scope of coverage and depth of obligations. ,
33
C. International Law: Is It Really Obeyed?
As technology and transnational investment continue to accelerate
globalization, the world will face many challenges and changes.33 Because
only forty-nine of the world's hundred largest economies are nations and
fifty-one are corporations, traditional nation states slowly become more
unnatural.: s "[G]lobalization [lessens] the authority of less influential
nations" because larger economies of nations and corporations manipulate
31the market to their advantage. 36 On the contrary, economic superpowers,like the United States, find few obstacles to pursuing their goals and
327. See generally id. at 1197-1200 (because the WTO has not yet established a
multilateral agreement on competition policy, new RTAs, like the FTAA or NAFTA, have
the ability to develop and influence this new area of international law).
328. Bishop & Chandler, supra note 232, at 914.
329. Picker, supra note 9, at 274.
330. Bishop & Chandler, supra note 232, at 914.
331. See generally Picker, supra note 9, at 284-287 (suggesting that the WTO will become
irrelevant as large RTAs abuse the GATT through its provided exceptions and pursue their
own goals).
332. Id. at 284.
333. Bishop & Chandler, supra note 232, at 914.
334. Murphy, supra note 264, at 49-50.
335. Id. at 50.
336. Id. at 53.
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interests.337 "U.S. lawyers and U.S. policymakers tend to be dismissive of
international law as an operative social force" even though most
transactions that they make fall within a transnational scope.338
The WTO legal system is part of a larger system of public
international law which incorporates traditional sources of law into the
WTO agreements, consisting of customary law, "general principles of law,
and other international instruments. ' 39 In regard to compliance, the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body attempts to regulate international trade by
finding an impairment, adopting a report, and recommending that the
offending country remedy the injury within a reasonable amount of time. 40
If that process fails, the Dispute Settlement Body can apply sanctions in
the form of suspension or withdrawal of tariff concessions.34 1 Although
this seems effective, the WTO lacks a strong enforcement measure that is
342likely to compel compliance. The larger economies, such as the United
States, the EU, Japan, and China, have the most leverage to enforce
rulings and compel compliance from smaller economies; however, the issue
remains as to whether the larger economies would obey adverse rulings,
and whether anyone could force them to comply.
343
"[T]o date, there are no firmly established principles of international
law that would effectively resolve the issues arising from extraterritorial
application of competition laws." 344  Jurisdictional principles remain
disputed, and a unanimous agreement to a single set of principles will not
likely be achieved.34' A number of nations recently chose to cooperate
bilaterally with others on the issue of competition policy and enforcement;
however, a multilateral agreement dealing with similar issues will likely
cause more disputes than it will solve.346  Bilaterally, the two parties
concerned can easily address their own unique issues, and bilateral
agreements may also act as a transition into plurilateral or multilateral
agreements on international cooperation.347
337. Id. at 54.
338. Id. at 55-56.
339. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 76.
340. Paul, supra note 89, at 334.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See generally id. at 334-35 (illustrating the WTO Dispute Settlement Body's lack of
enforcement, and suggesting that the EU, Japan, China, and the U.S. are the only powers
with enough leverage to enforce rulings).
344. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 564.
345. See id.
346. See id. at 569-70.
347. See id. at 570.
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V. CONCLUSION
Many challenges lie ahead for the WTO, as it must address the ever-
changing needs of the future, "integrate broader social concerns into its
348
agenda," and respond to the needs of lesser developed countries. The
WTO's youth and unprecedented dispute settlement system will determine
whether it will succeed or fail in the future coupled with whether it can
maintain its composure while addressing the challenges.3 49 Besides future
challenges, the WTO has numerous challenges it is currently facing. The
liberal interpretation of the GATT gives WTO members much discretion
as to what trade policies and what forms of domestic protection they wish
to pursue.
Regional Trade Agreements support the ideals embodied in the
WTO; however, they may be responsible for the WTO's demise.
Internally, they support trade liberalization and despise discrimination, yet
externally. they refuse to extend the same preferential treatment. RTAs
respect the Most-Favored Nation and National Treatment principles
internally, yet they discriminate externally. The United States once
opposed free-trade agreements, but it quickly abandoned such feelings
upon the formation of the European Common Market.35 ° Also, Mexico
desired "to attract American investment and increase trade," which
eventually led to the formation of NAFTA.15 Fearing European
competition and lusting for "control over the main assets in Latin
American economies, thus consolidating the southern part of the
hemisphere as its secure economic backyard," the idea of the FTAA
352logically followed NAFTA.
Comprised of some of the world's largest economies, a wide variety
and hefty supply of natural resources, and diverse human capital, the
FTAA proves virtually self-sufficient. While the FTAA Draft
Agreement relies heavily on the fundamental principles provided by the
GATT and WTO, it also includes much of its own influence, offering
protection and benefits to its potential members, and it addresses new
topics unregulated by the WTO, 3 5 4 If the FTAA succeeds, there will be
348. Id. at 589.
349. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 590.
350. Buve, supra note 213, at 197.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 199.
353. See id. at 197-206.
354. See generally The Free Trade Area of the Americas Draft Agreement, Nov. 21, 2003,
available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/Index e.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2006)
(summarizing the general ideals of the FTAA).
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little need to deal outside the group. Trade deals will evolve from the
multilateral, country-to-country negotiations, to regional, RTA-to-RTA
negotiations. As the world's hegemonic leaders continue to play by their
own rules and regionalism continues to grow, the question remains: Will
the WTO succeed, or will it erode into history?

